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8 September 1956

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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State Dept. review completed

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
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
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**3. FAILURE TO CHECK NASR MAY FORCE FRENCH CONCESSIONS IN ALGERIA**

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Premier Mollet's chief hope of minimizing the threats to his government over the Suez and Algerian crises appears to lie in a radical shift in Algerian policy--possibly along the lines of a negotiated cease-fire. He may undertake this even at the risk of strong attacks by the right on the government when the National Assembly reconvenes on 2 October.

The American embassy in Paris reports a growing conviction among government officials that Minister Lacoste's Algerian policy of pacification before negotiation must be altered before November since France has failed to achieve a strong negotiating position in either the Suez affair or Algeria.

Despite some weakening in the ultra-nationalists' feeling on Algeria, as evidenced by Marshal Juin's suggestion of a federal solution, there is still strong resistance in the assembly to negotiations with rebel leaders. Mollet's position will be further jeopardized if Minister Lacoste does not respond favorably to a switch in policy.

Much of French official opinion continues to be that unless Premier Nasr is removed from power or suffers a loss of prestige, there is no hope of holding Algeria.

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
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## 6. BRITISH VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH GREECE

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British Foreign Office permanent under secretary Kirkpatrick states that Britain recognizes the importance of maintaining the Karamanlis government in Greece, and that its probable successor would "no doubt" be more intransigent on the Cyprus issue.

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Kirkpatrick stated, however, that Britain does not plan to respond to the recent indications of a more conciliatory Greek attitude by initiating discussions with Athens on the British constitutional proposals for Cyprus now being prepared. He said Greece should demonstrate its changed attitude publicly, or at least to the Cyprus ethnarchy and the Greek Cypriots.

### Comment

Kirkpatrick's statement may indicate a reversal of Britain's estimate of the probable situation in Greece were Karamanlis to fall. London does not appear, however, to have overcome its suspicion of Karamanlis sufficiently to set about improving relations with his government.

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